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I
INTRODUCTION

Most contemporary procedures for mass litigation were developed in a
slow, reasoned fashion, as a result of professional study, scholarly discourse,
judicial decisionmaking, and appellate review.' Claims resolution facilities, in
contrast, are creatures of necessity. Each facility this symposium describes
emerged from a specific litigation, and each reflects what the key participants
perceived as the exigencies of the particular situation. All are the product of
compromising the competing interests of parties, attorneys, judges, and other
court actors. 2 Those interests determined the broad outlines of each facility,
as well as certain key features, such as the "first-in, first-out (FIFO)"
processing rule of the original plan for the Manville Personal Injury Trust.3
Purely pragmatic considerations appear to have influenced other aspects of
facility design and implementation. For example, despite the FIFO rule, the
Manville Personal Injury Trust attempted to settle any case scheduled for
trial, regardless of its original filing date, in an effort to reduce litigation
costs. 4 Neither those who developed the plans for the facilities nor those

charged with operating them could draw upon the results of objective
analyses comparing different approaches to achieving their goals. Indeed,
descriptions of the discussions and debates surrounding the establishment of
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well as the more recent appellate history of class action certification for mass torts. See Judith
Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, " 54 L & Contemp Probs (forthcoming 1991).
2. For a discussion of courts' interests in resolving mass litigation, see Mark A. Peterson &
Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited Power of Courts, 54 L & Contemp Probs
(forthcoming 1991).
3. See Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust,
53 L & Contemp Probs 27 (Autumn 1990). According to the FIFO rule, cases were to be processed
in order of the original date of filing in court.
4. See Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities,
53 L & Contemp Probs 113 (Autumn 1990).
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the facilities suggest that all of those involved felt they were creating unique
5
institutions.
Claims resolution facilities should not be thought of as sui generis
institutions, however. These facilities operate compensation programs similar
to Social Security Disability Insurance, workers' compensation, the federal
Black Lung Program, and the recently created statute-based Vaccine
Compensation Program. 6 Like the designers and managers of those more
familiar programs, those who design and manage claims facilities need to
grapple with issues related to funding, eligibility rules, payment schedules,
and claims screening and valuation procedures.
In this article, I propose an agenda for research on claims resolution
facilities, the results of which could assist in improving the current set of
facilities and fashioning better alternatives for the future. 7 The objectives of
the proposed research are to describe the outcomes of different facilities, to
examine differences in outcomes among the facilities and between claims
facilities and other compensation systems (including the tort liability system),
and to develop a better understanding of the relationship between key design
and implementation decisions and these outcomes. In Parts II and III of the
article, I discuss the outcomes of interest and the relationships between
design and outcomes that merit further investigation. In Part IV, I briefly
consider the feasibility of collecting systematic empirical data on the claims
resolution facilities. I conclude in Part V by discussing the public interest in
research on claims facilities.
II
OUTCOMES OF CLAIMS REsOLUTION FACILITIES

Over the past decade, empirical analyses of case outcomes, transaction
costs, and procedural justice have enhanced our understanding of the tort
system.8 Similar research has been conducted on the outcomes of workers'
compensation and auto no-fault systems, 9 and on some social benefit
5. There is no evidence in descriptions of the creation of the facilities, for example, that the
parties turned to studies of statutory-based compensation programs for information or ideas on
program design and implementation. See these proceedings.
6. See, for example, Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L & Contemp
Probs 79 (Autumn 1990).
7. The development of claims resolution facilities is one facet of the larger issue of the
consequences of aggregating mass torts. My proposed research agenda does not attempt to address
this larger issue. Nor does it address the question of why certain design features were adopted by
each facility.
8. For examples of such analyses, see Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findingsfrom
Institutefor Civil Justice Research, 48 Ohio St LJ 479 (1987);James S. Kakalik & Abby Robyn, Costs of the
CivilJustice System: Court Expendituresfor Processing Tort Cases (Inst for Civil Justice, RAND, 1982); E.
Allan Lind, et al, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experience in the Civil Justice
System, 24 L & Soc'y Rev 953 (1990).
9. For example, see Workers Compensation Research Institute, Annual Report/Research
Review (1990); James K. Hammitt & John E. Rolph, Limiting Liabilityfor Automobile Accidents: Are NoFault Tort Thresholds Effective?, 7 L & Pol 493 (1985).
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systems.' 0 Many controversies attending the design and implementation of
claims resolution facilities also concern issues related to the pattern of case
outcomes, transaction costs, and procedural justice. Developing comparative
data on these consequences should therefore be central to our research
agenda. We also need better information on how effective the facilities are in
including those who are eligible for compensation under the plan and in
foreclosing future litigation. Finally, judges, who must often approve the
establishment and design of claims resolution facilities, should know more
about claimants' responses to the facilities: how well they understand what
they have to do to claim compensation; how satisfied they are with the
outcomes they obtain; and whether particular classes of claimants have special
problems dealing with the claims resolution process.
A.

Patterns of Case Outcomes

Each claims facility was intended to produce a particular pattern of
outcomes: some classes of claimants would be denied compensation entirely,
and others would receive amounts determined by a combination of factors,
some of which were set forth in the claims resolution plan and others of which
were determined by subsequent implementation decisions. " What have been
the effects of these decisions? Who wins, who loses under each plan? To
answer these questions, we need to know (1) the average recovery ratios, that
is, the ratio of compensation (net of attorney fees and other legal expenses) to
loss; (2) the distribution of recovery ratios, by total and net economic loss,
injury characteristics, sociodemographic characteristics such as income,
education, race, ethnicity, and gender, and any additional characteristics that
were incorporated in the rules for determining levels of payment; and (3) the
timing of payment, in relation to injury onset, accrual of losses, initial date of
claim, and date of creation of the facility. Average recovery ratios will enable
us to determine how well the level of payment matched the intentions of the
facility designers, and to compare payment patterns across facilities, and
between facilities and other compensation programs. Distributional data on
recovery ratios are essential to understanding the social consequences of
payment plans. Many payment plans were designed to reflect the values of
cases processed through the traditional tort processes, prior to claims
resolution. It seems reasonable, therefore, to compare distributional data for
these facilities to similar data for the tort system. Although most claims
resolution plans do not link payments directly to need, from a public policy
perspective, how well the programs serve claimants' needs is clearly an
10. For example, see Peter Barth, The Tragedy of Black Lung (W.S. Upjohn Inst for Employment
Res, 1987); Theodore Marmon & Jerry Mashaw, eds, Social Security: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis
(Princeton U Press, 1988).
II. "Plan" refers to, for example, the formal document adopted to resolve the litigation, In re A.
H. Robins, Co., The Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of
the Bankruptcy Code, No 85-01307-R (March 28, 1988). "Implementation decisions" refers to, for
example, the specific provisions regarding medical records laid out in information packets sent to
Dalkon Shield claimants.
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important issue. By comparing amounts received to net economic loss (that
is, losses not covered by private insurance or other sources of
reimbursement), we can obtain at least a crude measure of how well the
payment plans met the parties' needs, independent of the strength of their

legal claims. The third factor, timing of payment, is an issue of concern to any
compensation program and was a particular source of controversy in
designing some of the facilities. Timing of payment in relation to injury onset
and loss accrual also has an obvious equity dimension.
B.

Transaction Costs

Transaction costs are measured by the ratio of expenses incurred in
delivering compensation to total costs of providing compensation. Analyses
of the transaction costs associated with the traditional tort system usually
include both sides' attorneys' fees and expenses, insurance claims' processing
costs, and the operational costs of the court system. 12 Similarly, to measure
transaction costs of claims facilities, we need to know (1) the total expenses to
operate the claims facilities, distinguishing general overhead expenses, inhouse costs to process individual claims, and fees and expenses for outside
counsel and other outside consultants, and (2) the fees and expenses for
claimants' lawyers. Because many claims facilities apply different approaches
to different classes of claimants, it would be useful to be able to compare
transaction costs for processing different classes of claims. Additionally,
because claims facilities are relatively new institutions, analyses of transaction
costs should consider changes in cost ratios over time.
C.

Procedural Justice

In designing claims resolution facilities, attorneys and court officials
appear to have focused more on issues of distributional justice (who should
get how much, for what injuries and losses) than on issues of procedural
justice (what types of claims resolution process would claimants perceive to be
fair). Americans, however, as evidenced by extensive research on individuals'
experiences dealing with the justice system and other public institutions,
distinguish between distributional and procedural fairness.' 3 Litigants and
clients of government programs obviously care about what they get from
courts and other institutions, but they also care about how they are treated by
public officials. In particular, civil litigants are more likely to feel that court
procedures are fair when decisionmaking is (or appears to be) deliberative

and thorough, when they themselves are treated in a dignified fashion, and
when they believe they have some control over the decisionmaking process,
12. See, for example, James S. Kakalik & Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort
Litigation (Inst for Civil Justice, RAND, 1988).
13. For a review of these research findings, see E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social
Psychology of Proceduraljustice (Plenum, 1988).
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either directly or indirectly through their legal representatives.' 4 Just as
researchers have studied variations in perceived procedural justice among
different dispute resolution procedures, we should investigate variations in
5
procedural justice among different claims resolution facilities.'
D.

Claim Inclusion and Closure

Claims facilities, like other aggregative procedures (such as class actions)
require some means of identifying eligible claims. Ideally, the claims facility
should receive claims from all legitimate claimants; it should also be able to
detect and reject non-legitimate claims. In addition, most claims facility
agreements seek to reduce the defendants' uncertainty about the amount they
would have to pay, either by setting a ceiling for that amount (as in the Dalkon
Shield agreement), by providing for a regular transfer of assets (as in the
Manville Personal Injury Trust agreement), or by allocating fixed shares of
damage payments among defendants (as in the asbestos claims facilities).
Once these agreements have been reached, parties typically have a shared
interest in precluding renegotiation or relitigation of the agreement.
Toward these ends, at the time each claims resolution facility was
designed, a determination was made as to how much money would be
necessary to resolve present and future claims. Estimating the ultimate
number and value of claims was a source of great controversy and, in at least
two cases to date, misestimation has led to an unravelling of claims resolution
plans.' 6 Moreover, with at least one plan, there has been considerable
controversy over whether all those eligible for compensation have been
informed properly and will seek compensation.' 7 Research on claims
resolution facilities therefore also should consider the number of claims
received, the patterns of claims filing over time (that is, what types of claims
are filed, by what types of claimants, at different stages of the claims
resolution process), and the amount of aggregate payments. Comparing
14. E. Allan Lind, et al, The Perception of Justice: Tort Litigants' Views of Trial, Court-Annexed
Arbitration, and Judicial Settlement Conferences 52-53 (Inst for Civil justice, RAND, 1989) ("Views of
Trial").
15. Some critics of research on procedural justice argue that findings may be an artifact of "false
consciousness," that is, procedures may be designed to make litigants believe they have been treated
fairly when an objective assessment would conclude the opposite. Clearly, measures of perceived
fairness should not substitute for more objective measures of outcomes. Other things being equal,
however, we would prefer justice systems that are believed to be fair by those they serve. For a
review of the debate over the importance of perceived fairness, see id at 4-6.
16. The first asbestos claims facility disintegrated when it became clear that the pattern of claims
filing was not that which had been anticipated by the participating defendants at the time they drew
up their cost-sharing agreements. Lawrence Fitzpatrick,' The Center for Claims Resolution, 53 L &
Contemp Probs 13, 14-17 (Autumn 1990). The Manville Personal Injury Trust plan was reopened
when Judge Jack Weinstein determined that the trust could not meet ongoing requests for payment.
In the Matter ofJoint Asbestos Litigation, Johns-Manville Corp., Transcript of Fairness Hearings (E & SD
NY, Washington, D.C., January 4, 1991) ("Transcript of Fairness Hearings"). See also Smith, 53 L &
Contemp Probs at 28 (cited in note 3).
17, Advocates of Dalkon Shield claimants assert that many women never received notice of the
bankruptcy. See Frank Green, More than 300 late claimants of Dalkon funds show up at court, Richmond
News Leader B2 (October 20, 1990).
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these data to the estimates upon which the plan was based, as well as to the
other estimates that were proposed and rejected at the time the plan was
developed, will provide useful indicators of the performance of claims
facilities concerning inclusion. Researchers should also review the nature,
costs, and outcomes of post-agreement controversies-for example,
renegotiations of key issues.
To improve our understanding of the claims identification process, it may
also be useful to examine data that do not derive directly from the claims
resolution facilities. For example, studies of changes in the level of public
information about injurious products' 8 and investigations of the relationship
between media coverage of injury and litigation events and claims filing might
suggest how the dissemination of information affects claiming propensities.
Similarly, it might be useful to examine patterns of response to public notices
regarding class certification and settlement, and patterns of voting on
proposed bankruptcy reorganization plans.
E.

Claimant Response to Claims Resolution Facilities

The goal of claims resolution facilities is to deliver compensation to
individuals. Individual claimants, however, play little or no role in the design
of compensation facilities and, to date, there has been no empirical research
on the claimants' views of the outcomes they receive, the costs they incur, or
their perceptions of the processes that determine their eligibility and amount
of payment. We do not know how much claimants understand about the
operations of the facilities, what is expected of them, or what they can do to
influence outcomes; nor do we know what aspects of the facilities' operations
they would like to know more about. We do not know how well claimants
understand the information they are given about payment options, nor how
good a job they do in selecting the payment option that is objectively best for
them. We also do not know how important non-economic goals are to
claimants, what outcomes other than monetary payments they would find
desirable, or whether they would be willing to trade monetary payments for
other benefits. Moreover, many claimants are members of disadvantaged
groups, for example, poor Black residents of Triana, Alabama, blue-collar
shipyard workers, and women. These individuals may face particular
disadvantages when dealing with facilities that were designed and are
operated, for the most part, by affluent, white, professional males. In
discussions of claims resolution facilities-as in discussions of legal processes
more generally-the voices of judges, lawyers, corporations, experts, and
researchers predominate. 19 Empirical studies of claimants' experiences and
18. See, for example, Herbert M. Kritzer, Public Votification Campaigns in Mass Litigalion: The
Dalkon Shield Case, Just Sys J 13 (1988-89).
19. We should note that none of the papers in this symposium were written by claimants or
claimant representatives; nor, to my knowledge, did any of these individuals attend the conference
that preceded the publication of these papers.
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attitudes would help give voice to those whose injuries were responsible for
initiating the claims resolution process.
III
EXPLAINING OUTCOMES OF CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITIES

In his contribution to this symposium 2 0 Mark Peterson has taken a first
step toward the type of descriptive analysis I propose above. His analysis is
limited, however, by lack of data on many important outcomes. Moreover, at
this preliminary analytic stage, Peterson cannot tell us much about why
different facilities have produced different outcomes.
Identifying
relationships between key design and implementation decisions and facility
outcomes is the most important task for public policy analysis.
Designing and implementing the claims resolution facilities required
numerous decisions. In principle, each of these decisions could have had
important effects on patterns of case outcomes, costs, procedural fairness,
inclusion and closure, and claimant response. It would be impractical,
however, to attempt to study the effects of every decision. The research
agenda should therefore be shaped around a consideration of the
consequences of choosing particular models of compensation delivery. Not all
key decisions derive from such overarching choices, however. Below, I first
outline a conceptual framework for identifying models of compensation
delivery, and then discuss some additional design decisions that seem worthy
of research.
A.

Models of Compensation Delivery

The essential purpose of all claims resolution facilities is to give away
money. The decisions made in designing and operating facilities concern how
much money will be given away in total, to what people, upon presentation of
what information, and according to what processing rules. There are
numerous ways to answer such questions, but we can think of each claims
facility, and other compensation program, as falling somewhere within a twodimensional matrix, where one dimension represents rules for determining
the value of claims and the other dimension represents rules for processing
claims. 2 ' Figure 1 depicts this matrix.

20. Peterson, 53 L & Contemp Probs 113 (cited in note 4).
21. My thinking about models of compensation delivery has been informed by discussions with
Elizabeth Rolph. In a forthcoming Institute for Civil Justice monograph, Rolph presents a more
elaborated conceptual framework for analyzing compensation programs. Elizabeth Rolph, Designing
Alternative Compensation Systems (Inst for Civil justice, RAND, forthcoming). Peterson, 53 L &
Contemp Probs 113 (cited in note 4), presents a somewhat different conceptual framework for
categorizing claims facilities.
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FIGURE 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS

22
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Administrative systems implement strict objective rules regarding eligibility for compensation, use schedules to determine amounts to be paid to
particular individuals, and process claims bureaucratically. An administrative
compensation system could use any of a variety of the principles indicated in
Figure 1 to determine the value of claims, including what the claims would be
worth in a litigation system.

In practice, most administrative systems,

including the Social Security Disability Insurance System, most workers' compensation systems, and the Agent Orange facility, 23 use some variant of a
need-driven schedule to determine award amounts. Unlike these need-driven
systems, the first DDT class action settlement divided the total award equally

among class members, while the second used a schedule based on litigation
values. 24 The administrative model is attractive in situations where funds are
limited, because payment schedules provide a means of predetermining how

much will be spent (assuming the number of claimants is properly estimated).
Administrative facilities are also more easily centralized, which makes it easier
to monitor and, hence, control the outflow of cash.
Adjudicative systems typically employ looser, more subjective eligibility
rules, determine the amounts to be paid on a case-by-case basis, and depend
on an adversarial process to determine outcomes. In such systems, a neutral
22. The assignment of the various claims resolution facilities to categories is based on
information presented in this symposium. SSDI refers to the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program. DDT(1) refers to the first DDT class action settlement; DDT(2) refers to the second
settlement, designed by Francis McGovern. For a discussion of the DDT claims resolution process,
see Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 L & Contemp Probs 61 (Autumn
1990). ACF refers to the asbestos claims facilities. Both the first and the current facility used
litigation-values to assess claims. See generally Fitzpatrick, 53 L & Contemp Probs 13 (cited in note
16).
23. See Harvey P. Berman, The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program, 53 L & Contemp Probs 49
(Autumn 1990).
24. See McGovern, 53 L & Contemp Probs 61 (cited in note 22).
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third-party decides all cases that the adversaries cannot resolve among themselves. These third-party decisions, in turn, influence the outcomes of disputes that the parties settle themselves. The tort liability system is the
quintessential example of an adjudicative system. Claims resolution facilities
employing adjudicative systems try to settle cases through bilateral bargaining. When bargaining fails, however, cases revert to the traditional tort
system. The adjudicative model is attractive when a premium is placed on
individualized treatment of claims and claimants.
In principle, adjudicative claims resolution facilities could use a variety of
rules for determining claim value. For example, if a facility adopted needbased rules, the adversaries would contest the question of how needy the
claimant really was, introducing evidence on loss, family resources, and other
sources of available compensation. Some compensation systems do, in fact,
provide for such adjudicative contests. Social Security decisions, for example,
sometimes lead to court contests on the claimants' degree of disability. 25 In

practice, adjudicative claims facilities such as the Asbestos Claims Facility and
the Manville Trust have chosen to use a litigation-standard in determining
26
claims values.
Some programs are deliberately designed to mix characteristics of the
administrative and adjudicative models. For example, the workers compensation system in Texas refers contested claims to the tort liability system for
resolution. 27 Among claims resolution facilities, the Dalkon Shield facility is
an example of such a mixed approach. 28 Claimants may apply for payment of
fixed amounts and are assured compensation if, upon presentation of specific
evidence, the claim meets minimum verification standards. Unlike DDT(2)
claimants, however, who apparently lacked recourse to an adjudicative system,
Dalkon Shield claimants may reject this option of scheduled payments in favor
of an adversarial process that demands more extensive evidence and uses
alternative dispute resolution and/or trial to determine whether and how
much compensation will be paid. Although a mixed approach to claims
processing could use a variety of standards, the Dalkon Shield facility appears
to have based its schedule of payments upon a litigation standard. Claimants
are offered less if they cannot produce documents to verify Shield use or causation, for example, because in the tort system, they would face obstacles to
winning their claims without such verification. Supporters of mixed strategies
presumably seek to gain the benefits of both the administrative and adjudicative models without incurring their costs.

25. Rolph, Designing Alternative Compensation Systems (cited in note 21).
26. Fitzpatrick, 53 L & Contemp Probs at 21-22 (cited in note 16); Smith, 53 L & Contemp
Probs at 32-33 (cited in note 3).
27. See Peter Barth, Richard Victor & Susan Eccleston, Workers' Compensation in Texas (Workers
Compensation Res Inst, 1989).
28. Feinberg, 53 L & Contemp Probs at 105-09 (cited in note 6).
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Because several different facilities have chosen to use the same model of
compensation delivery, we have an opportunity to investigate whether outcomes are wholly idiosyncratic-that is, facility specific--or are systematically
related to these overarching models.
B.

Other Key Decisions

Some decisions about claims facility design and implementation do not
derive directly from the choice of a particular model for compensation
delivery. Among such decisions, those that seem likely to have had important
effects include: (1) the claims estimation strategies; (2) the order of payments;
(3) the claimant outreach procedures; (4) the establishment of a new, standalone organization rather than the employment of an existing private or
public agency to deliver compensation; (5) the recruitment and staffing
strategies; and (6) the roles assigned to attorneys, both those representing
claimants and those acting on behalf of the facilities.
1. Claims Estimation. Some claims resolution plans, such as the Dalkon
Shield plan and the DDT(2) plan, were based on quite extensive research on
the size of the claimant pools and the aggregate value of claims. 29 Others,
such as the Agent Orange plan, 30 were adopted without much information
about either. Still others, such as the original Manville Plan and the first
asbestos claims facility, seem to have been based on faulty data.3 ' Perhaps we
can learn how to develop better estimation strategies and how much to invest
in the estimation process by relating the nature of the estimation processes in
the various claims resolution plans to the actual outcomes.
2. Order of Payments. The Manville Trust adopted a strict rule for paying
claims in the order in which the associated lawsuits had first been filed. The
recently announced amendment to the plan3 2 proposes a more complex
ordering based on the severity of each claimant's exposure-related illness.
Under the Dalkon Shield agreement, thousands of minimum-value Option 1
claims were processed before claimants were provided with detailed
information about other payment options. In assessing claims facilities, it is
important to investigate how these different approaches have affected
distributional equity and plaintiffs' perceptions of fairness.
3. Claimant Outreach Procedures. The Dalkon Shield program developed and
mailed to claimants elaborate sets of materials explaining the claims
resolution plan and the available payment options. In a public presentation to
claimants, Special Master Francis McGovern delivered a detailed
29. See, respectively, Feinberg, 53 L & Contemp Probs at 101-03 (cited in note 6); McGovern,
53 L & Contemp Probs at 64 (cited in note 22).
30. Up until several days before the $180 million settlement was reached, participants in the
Agent Orange Plan had little hard information on the number of potential claims. See Peter H.
Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts 161-62 (Belknap, 1986).
31. See discussion in note 16.
32. See Transcript of Fairness Hearings (cited in note 16).
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description-complete with multicolor graphics-of the rationale and
implementation plans for the DDT(2) settlement. Descriptions of the
information dissemination practices and materials of other facilities are not
currently available, but several facilities appear to depend on claimants'
attorneys to disseminate information. Research on outreach should
determine the level of claimant knowledge regarding each facility's rules and
operation, and the sources claimants turn to for information.
4. Stand-alone Versus Existing Facilities, and Staffing Strategies. Only the Agent
Orange facility chose to contract with a private agency for the payment of its
claims rather than create a new stand-alone facility. The stand-alone facilities
made rather different decisions concerning location, staffing patterns, and
other administrative issues. Although we would expect these different
strategies to result in significantly different transaction costs, research might
reveal that they also have important consequences for patterns of payments,
procedural justice, and claimant satisfaction-all of which should be explored.
5. Role of A ttorneys. All current claims resolution facilities include attorneys
as staff members and/or representatives of claimants. Although some
facilities developed procedures to minimize the need for attorney
representation, others assumed the attorneys' involvement would continue at
the same levels as observed during the litigation process. What is the
relationship between attorney use and claimant outcomes? Do certain kinds
of claims resolution plans require the use of attorneys if claimants are to
obtain the intended outcomes? Do certain kinds of claimants need attorneys
to help them master the details of claiming, regardless of claims facility
design? How much does attorney representation cost? How much, if at all,
would claimants as a group benefit, with regard to payments received, if
attorney fees were regulated? How much should claims facilities pay their
counsel to represent them in litigation or other dispute resolution processes?
What would be the costs and benefits of regulating their fees? Because
attorneys serve a central role in the claims resolution process, these are very
sensitive questions. From a public policy perspective, however, if claims
resolution facilities are to be substituted for the traditional litigation process,
it appears appropriate to try to answer them.
IV
THE FEASIBILITY OF CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON CLAIMS

RESOLUTION FACILITIES

Conducting detailed analyses of the type outlined in this article will be
expensive and time consuming. But the research that has already been
conducted while designing the facilities indicates that it is possible to carry
out such studies. At least two of the claims resolution plans described in this
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symposium, the Dalkon Shield Plan and the DDT(2) plan, 33 were derived after
extensive data collection and analysis spearheaded by the special master,
including, in the latter case, claimant interviews. As part of their efforts to
resolve asbestos litigation, the federal district courts in Eastern Texas and
Northern Ohio have mandated similar data collection and analysis efforts.

34

The data collection methods and forms that were developed for these
efforts could be modified to collect information about case outcomes from the
facilities' claims files. Some components of transaction costs also should be
available from the facilities' administrative records. Because procedural
justice and claimant satisfaction are subjective concepts, however, studies of
these aspects of the claims resolution process will require surveys of
individuals. It would be relatively easy to adapt the approach that has been
used in studying litigants' perceptions of traditional tort processes to study
claimants' experiences with claims resolution facilities. These surveys would
also yield additional data on transaction costs and outcomes.
The key question concerning feasibility is whether those who maintain the
relevant databases will choose to cooperate. Because the facilities are
essentially private institutions, they need not provide access to their data, and
there are several reasons why they might not wish to do so. First, the research
would disrupt ordinary bureaucratic processes: business would be
interrupted as the analysts searched administrative records and machinereadable data bases, and talked to key personnel about facility operations.
Second, data on individual case characteristics and outcomes are private,
raising issues of confidentiality. Even providing the claimants' names to
survey researchers might be viewed as a breach of confidentiality. Finally,
research findings might change claims filing patterns and negotiation
strategies. For example, if claimants and their representatives knew what the
average claim payment was, they might be less inclined to settle for an amount
less than the average. Many legal practitioners believe that the negotiation
process benefits from uncertainty regarding outcomes.
Research techniques have been developed for dealing with the first two of
these concerns. Survey analysts experienced in the use of public and private
administrative data have developed procedures for minimizing the burden
such research operations place on administrative staffs. Most large-scale
surveys conducted for public policy purposes are regulated by statutes and/or
rules that prohibit disclosure of participants' identities and require security
measures to protect private data, whether in computer-readable or hard-copy
form. Survey researchers have a repertoire of procedures for deleting names
and other identifying information from interviews before data are
transformed into machine-readable form, destroying identifiable hard-copy
records, and the like.
33. See, respectively, Feinberg, 53 L & Contemp Probs at 101-03 (cited in note 6); McGovern,
53 L & Contemp Probs at 64 (cited in note 22).
34. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a FunctionalApproach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U
Chi L Rev 440, 480 (1986).
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The third concern, that systematic information about outcomes will
somehow impair facility performance, is more troublesome. The claims
resolution plans are based upon certain assumptions about claimants' and
attorneys' behavior. If these behaviors change, a plan could prove
unworkable. On the other hand, in the past decade we have all learned more
about the outcomes of the tort liability system, but I am not aware of any
published statements arguing that this knowledge has significantly changed
behavior. Moreover, it seems unlikely that claimants' representatives are so
ignorant of the pattern of payments that aggregate statistical analyses of the
facilities' consequences would dramatically change their negotiation
strategies.
When to conduct such research is clearly an issue. Because some facilities
are intended to operate for many years, waiting until all claims have been paid
is impractical if our purpose is to inform decisionmaking in the near term.
Collecting data on long-past events is also difficult, because records may be
destroyed or archived in hard-to-access facilities, and because memories fade.
On the other hand, initiating research too early in the implementation process
would be disruptive and might yield misleading results. My suggestion would
be to design-in a capacity for the type of research I have proposed, for example,
by insuring the retention of key data, but delay research until the program has
stabilized. Thereafter, one might conduct periodic studies of the facilities as
they progress.
V
CONCLUSION

Claims resolution facilities have played, and probably will continue to play,
a key role in resolving protracted mass litigation and delivering compensation
to claimants. Although the facilities are not themselves public institutions,
they have been created, for the most part, under the aegis of the courts. In
return for accepting compensation from claims resolution facilities, claimants
either give up their rights to civil trials or accept restrictions on these rights.
Judges who are asked to approve claims resolution plans in class action
settlements, bankruptcy reorganization plans, and other aggregative
procedures for mass torts should know more than we currently can tell them
about how these facilities affect patterns of payment, costs, and procedural
justice, how well they identify and serve legitimate claimants, and about
whether such facilities will indeed succeed in closing off future litigation.
Claims facility designers and managers of the future should know more about
how different design options will affect outcomes, costs, and perceptions of
fairness, and about how specific plan features influence claimant
understanding of and response to payment and procedural options. Research
of the type I propose in this article has been conducted in the public court
system for many decades. Working together in that context, judges, court
administrators, attorneys, and researchers have designed projects that
properly protect due process and citizens' privacy rights, and that have
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contributed to improving the efficiency and equity of dispute resolution. By
beginning to collect and analyze the types of data I have identified here, we
can help improve future decisionmaking about the aggregative resolution of
mass torts.

